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IN THE
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vs.
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION I
OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
Defendant.

13838

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This case was commenced on or about June 13, 1973
when Defendant notified Plaintiff that a hearing would
be held to determine whether Plaintiff had violated Section 35-4-5 (e), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
Hearings were held in Phoenix, Arizona on September
6,1973 and October 11,1973 before Hearing Officer W. M.
Haskell and decisions were entered on the evidence presented as set out below.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant, through its Board of Review, affirmed
previous decisions of the Department of Employment
Security and the Appeals Referee finding that Plaintiff
had violated Section 35-4-5 (e), Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended, by knowingly failing to report material
facts about his work and earnings and therefore Plaintiff
is liable for the sum of $2,229.00 paid to him during his
disqualification period.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff prays that the Court reverse the decision
of the Defendant's Board of Review based on the record
herein, or in the alternative, reverse and remand to the
Defendant for a new hearing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case centers around an Interstate claim for unemployment benefits filled out by the Plaintiff in
Phoenix, Arizona on September 1, 1972. This claim is
at Pages 50 and 51 of the Record. (Reference to the
Record will be made in the form R- Page Number, such
as R-50, 51.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff wilfully
withheld material facts on that claim by stating that he
did not work or earn wages during the prior weeks ending August 19, 1972 and August 26, 1972. Plaintiff admits
filling out the claim on September 1, 1972. Plaintiff
further admits that he worked for H & R Transfer and
Storage Co. of Phoenix, Arizona part-time during the
weeks ending August 19, 1972 and August 26, 1972 (R-
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39). However, Plaintiff was not paid for this work until
after September 1, 1972 the date he filed his claim (R40). Plaintiff reported to the Deputy assisting him in
preparing the claim that he had worked but didn't know
the amount earned since he hadn't been paid. Plaintiff
was then instructed to wait until he was paid before
reporting the wages earned, and consequently he answered the question as to earnings in the negative (R39).
Defendant thereafter received a Report of Earnings
from Plaintiff's employer stating that Plaintiff had
worked during the weeks ending August 19 and August
26 and that Plaintiff had been paid on August 18, August
19 and August 30th. Defendant initiated hearings to
deteormine whether Plaintiff had violated Section 35-45(e) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Two hearings were held in Phoenix, Arizona and testimony from
Plaintiff and from an employee of the Arizona Department of Employment Security was taken. Certain documents were also introduced into evidence. Based on this
evidence the Defendant's Department Representative
ruled against the Plaintiff. This decision was affirmed
by the Defendant's Appeals Referee and by the Defendant's Board of Review.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
EVIDENCE NOT CLEAR AND CONVINCING.
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To prove a case of fraud this Court has held that
the evidence must be clear and convincing. Perry v.
McConkie, 1 Utah 2d 189, 264 P. 2d 852 (1953). This
Court has further held that when one is charged with
a falsehood or misrepresentation, in order for it to be
actionable or to deprive him of a right, it must be done
wilfully and knowingly. Marks v. Continental Casualty
Co., 19 Utah 2d 119, 427 P. 2d 387 (1967).
In the instant case the evidence falls far short of
being clear or convincing the trier of fact that Plaintiff
wilfully and knowingly failed to report a material fact.
Rather the evidence reveals that the form Plaintiff filled
out is, at least with regard to permitting Plaintiff to
truly reflect his circumstances at the time of filling it
out, inadequate. Defendant has presented no evidence
as to the instructions given to Plaintiff in filling out the
form. Only Plaintiff has testified as to the instructions
received. Defendant has offered testimony from an Arizona Deputy as to his normal procedure, but this evidence only reveals how cursory and inadequate the instructions given to claimants are (R-24 to 29).
A.

Form is Inadequate.

The Form in question is at pp. 50 and 51 of the
Record. Question 10 of the form asks "During the
week (s) claimed in No. 7 and No. 8 above, did you work
or earn wages of any kind?". Plaintiff answered "no".
The question makes no allowance for Plaintiff's situation
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where he did work but was not paid. Plaintiff therefore
sought direction and was told to wait and report the
wages earned when they were paid. The Board of Review makes much over the fact that under question 10
there is provision for NO. of HOURS WORKED in large
letters (See R-4). The Board plainly feels that Plaintiff's failure to fill out this particular column is damning.
However, a reading of Question 10 shows that one would
only proceed to that column if Question 10 were answered "yes". Since Plaintiff responded "no" he would
naturally skip to the next question.
The Board further makes much of the fact that on
September 5, 1972 when Plaintiff filled out his next form
he reported $16.00 earned from a James Taylor (R-5).
Plaintiff has never denied that he knew how to complete
the form when he had worked and been paid. He was
paid cash by Mr. Taylor prior to September 5, 1972 (R42). Consequently, he so indicated on the Form (R-59).
Plaintiff's difficulty with the Form was when he had not
been paid his wages.
B.

Instruction was Inadequate.

The instruction given to Plaintiff upon filling out
the Form on September 1, 1972 is perhaps the key element in this case. The Defendant presented the testimony of a Mr. David Reyes of the Arizona Employment
Security Commission (R-24 et seq.). Mr. Reyes first of
all testified that he had no recollection of interviewing
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the Plaintiff (R-29). He further testified that he processes 400 to 500 claimants per week or 80 to 100 per
day (R-28). He further testified that he does not orally
interview the applicants (R-26). From this evidence it
can foe seen that the interviews, of necessity, are extremely brief and instruction offered is almost non-existent. Such a procedure is entirely consistent with
Plaintiff's testimony that he was told to wait until he
had been paid and then report the wages earned. Mr.
Reyes testified that if a claimant has not been paid he
is sent to another Deputy who would interview the claimant and if necessary call the employer. While this may
be the ideal procedure, in reality, when 80-100 claimants
are processed daily by one deputy, it is more believable
that a claimant would be told to report the earnings
when they are received.
C. Hearsay Evidence.
Essential portions of the Defendant's case rely on
hearsay evidence which cannot be clear and convincing
evidence. Defendant contends that Plaintiff was paid
prior to September 1, 1972 and therefore knowingly misrepresented the facts on the Form. Defendant relies on
a Report of Earnings prepared by the Controller of H
& R Transfer and Storage Co. (R-52, 53). This report
is hearsay. Plaintiff had no opportunity to cross-examine
the Controller.
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Consequently there is no waj of knowing whether
the dates under "date paid" mean date the checks were
written, date they were mailed, date the expense was
entered on the books, etc.
Defendant further relies on the hearsay evidence
of a Laura May Jassin to prove that Plaintiff received
a copy of Claimant's Handbook (R-58). This is actually
hearsay upon hearsay, the out of court word of Mrs.
Jassin interpreting the out of court statements of a person identified as "L. L."
To base a firidic ul iVaud on si ich hearsay when
the burden is clear arul convincing evidence is to deny
Plaintiff the most elementary and basic rights guaranteed by constitutional due process.

PLAINTIFF DENIED SUBSTANTIVE DUE

:"'luii.:lit lias \h ;-u assessed liability for $2,229.00 on
the grounds thai hi* knowingly withheld information
that he had earnings for the weeks ending August 19
and August 26th. If there were fraud here the damage
to the State would be no more than two weeks benefits
at $77.00 per week, or $154.00. There has been no showing that Plaintiff was not entitled to the $77.00 per week
for fae 50 week period, beginning with September 1,
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1972 and it must be presumed that he was entitled to
those benefits.
If the State is going to assess liability of $2,229.00
for damages of $154.00 it would seem, first of all, that
the level of proof required should at least match the seriousness of the penalty. In the instant case Plaintiff is
is subject to deprivation of property on the basis of hearsay evidence and speculation.
Secondly, this penalty violates the protection afforded by substantive due process. Although the State
has wide discretion in sotting penalties for violation of
its laws it is still bound by due process. A penalty that
is wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously
unreasonable violates due process. St. Louis, I. M. & S.
Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U. S, 63, 64 L. Ed. 139, 40 S.
Ct. 71. In the present case if Plaintiff was guilty of
fraud it would be to the extent of $154.00. To penalize
Plaintiff by assessing the amount of $2,229.00 against him
is wholly disproportionate to his offense and violates his
guarantee of constitutional due process.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's evidence is based in great part on hearsay. Defendant has offered no evidence as to how Plaintiff was instructed to fill out the Form. This evidence
falls far short of the required clear and convincing proof.
Moreover, Defendant is attempting to assess a penalty
against Plaintiff that has no reasonable relationship to
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
the offense allegedly committed by Plaintiff. Therefore,
the decision of Defendant's Board of Review must be
reversed or reversed and remanded for a new hearing.
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of January, 1975.
SPENCE-MOORE, LTD.

By
WILLIAM M. SPENCE
800 Luhrs Bldg.
11 W. Jefferson
Phoenix, Arizona 85003

By
BENJAMIN SPENCE
1401 Walker Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Copy of the foregoing mailed/delivered this 2nd day
of January, 1975 to:
Mr. Edgar M. Denny
Special Assistant Attorney General
The Industrial Commission of Utah
Department of Employment Security
174 Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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